Daniel Le Gall from SCRT, reported about the vulnerability he found in one of the Facebook servers. The problem is in the Sentry web application for logs storage, written in Python using the Django framework. Facebook experts have already patched a security hole in the server.
Daniel found the problem during the scanning of IP addresses of to the social network. On one of them Sentry service was located with host name
sentryagreements.thefacebook.com. When reviewing the application, the specialist noticed a stack trace that appears for an unexpected reason, and problems with the user password reset function. According to him, the Django debugging mode was not disabled, so the trace opened the entire environment of the program:
SCRT expert discovered among the keys of the environment
SESSION_SERIALIZER, which was related to the method
django.contrib.sessions.serializers.PickleSerializer. Daniel clarified that using a fake session containing arbitrary content of the binary Pickle protocol for serializing objects in Python, you can run any code in the system. To access the session, he needed a secret Django key, which appeared in the list of Sentry settings in plaintext called
The researcher wrote a proof-of-concept script that changed the existing contents of
sentrysid cookies to an arbitrary object and made the page load for 30 seconds longer:
import django.core.signing, django.contrib.sessions.serializers
from django.http import HttpResponse
#Initial cookie I had on sentry when trying to reset a password
newContent = django.core.signing.loads(cookie,key=SECRET_KEY,serializer=django.contrib.sessions.serializers.PickleSerializer,salt='django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies')
return (os.system,("sleep 30",))
newContent['testcookie'] = PickleRce()
He sent information about the vulnerability to Facebook team and received $ 5000 under the Bug Bounty program. The company specialists cleared the issue in 10 days after receiving the notification.